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The curse of natural resources is a well-documented phenomenon in developing 
countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. 
Among the transition economies of the former “Eastern Bloc”, a similar pattern can be 
observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the 
transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling 
for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural 
resource abundance and economic growth. 
Among the transition economies the prime reason for the curse of natural resource is 
corruption. Other reasons for the curse of natural resources may be Dutch disease effect 
and a neglect of education. 
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1 The Curse Of Natural Resources 
 
The curse of natural resources is a well-documented phenomenon. Numerous researches, 
for instance Gylfason (2001), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Sala-i-Martin (1997), have 
found a significant negative correlation between natural resource abundance and 
economic growth. This finding seemed puzzling at first, because classical economic 
theory would predict that abundant natural resources should be good for the economy. As 
a matter of fact, economic theory in the 19
th and early 20
th century often regarded land as 
an important production factor, and land is a natural resource. In his famous “Essay on 
the Principle of Population”, Thomas Malthus argued in 1798 that since land was a 
limited resource that does not grow, all other production factors would eventually run 
into diminishing returns, and thus economic growth would stop. Thus, a classical 
economist would expect that if one country has more natural resources than another 
otherwise similar country, the former would enjoy higher output per worker. Unless all 
countries in the world are in a steady state, this would translate into higher growth rates in 
countries that are relatively abundant in natural resources. 
Empirical studies have shown that reality contradicted theory: The richest countries today 
are in general rather poorly endowed with natural resources. Among them are the 
Western European countries, whose economies are based on manufacturing and services, 
because they have little natural resources. Another example is the experience of several 
Asian economies, notably Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which have shown that 
natural resources are not a necessary condition for rapid and sustained economic growth. 
None of the Asian tiger economies possesses significant natural resource endowments, 
but their average growth rates during the second half of the twentieth century have been 
higher than anywhere else in the world. South Korea and Taiwan achieved this even 
under difficult political circumstances. 
The negative relationship between natural resource abundance and growth is not only 
found in case studies like those of the East Asian economies, but also in cross-country 
analyses. Sachs and Warner (1995), using the share of primary exports in GDP as a 
measure of natural resource intensity, examine a sample of 97 developing countries in the The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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time period from 1970 to 1989 and find a significant negative correlation between GDP 
growth and the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP. Gylfason (2001) finds a negative 
relationship between the share of natural capital in total capital and economic growth. 
These findings provide evidence for the notion that a large endowment of natural 
resources leads to slower economic growth in a country. 
This relationship is robust - even after controlling for a number of other variables, it 
persists. Sala-i-Martin (1997) tests 62 variables that are suspected to explain GDP growth 
and finds that the fraction of primary products in exports ranks among the top twenty of 
them in terms of robustness. 
Confronted with these empirical findings, economists have developed theories that can 
explain the curse of natural resources. Some have argued that the findings might result 
from a bias in the indicator used, but Sachs and Warner (2001) test for possible bias
1 and 
find that the indicator they use, the share of primary exports in GDP, is unlikely to be 
biased. Most economists agree that there must be some sort of crowding out: If natural 
resources crowd out some activity X, and X is important for growth, then natural 
resources slow down growth. Plausible candidates for X include education, 
manufacturing, and sound government policy. 
The transition economies of Eastern Europe and Asia provide an interesting case, because 
they began their transition period under similar circumstances around 1990. In all of 
them, communist regimes had ruled for decades and were now thrown over and replaced 
by more or less democratically elected governments. All of them faced similar difficulties 
as they ventured to make the transition from centrally planned economies to market 
economies. Although the initial conditions were rather similar in these countries, their 
growth rates diverged dramatically during the 1990s. Some of them recovered quickly 
from the initial shock and have enjoyed positive growth rates for the last few years. 
Others have seen their output drop to less than half of the level of 1989 and still have not 
recovered. It is possible that these tremendous differences in economic performance can 
be partly explained by the curse of natural resources, because natural resource abundance 
is one characteristic in which the transition countries differed strongly from the onset on: 
Some have oil and ores, some have not. 
                                                 
1 A similar test is performed in Section 3 of this paper The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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This paper examines the effect of natural resource abundance on the growth performance 
of the transition economies of the former East during the 1990s. Section 2 delivers an 
overview of the existing literature on the curse of natural resources in general. Several 
sources are cited, providing evidence for the Curse that has been found in cross-country 
datasets containing mostly developed and developing countries. Some plausible 
explanations for the curse of natural resources are given. Section 3 is devoted to finding 
evidence for the curse of natural resources in the transition economies. A stepwise 
regression approach incorporating a wide range of plausible explanatory variables shows 
that natural resource abundance may be the most important factor explaining the growth 
differentials among the transition economies. In Section 4, the mechanism of the Curse is 
examined. Do natural resources lead to higher corruption, lower growth in 
manufacturing, and lower investment in human capital? And do these variables in turn 
affect growth? If so, how large is the effect? Section 5 forms the conclusion of this paper, 
summarising the main points and giving policy advice as well as suggestions for further 
research. 
 The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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2 Possible Explanations For The Curse 
 
Rent-Seeking And Corruption 
 
The availability of natural resources tends to lead to massive rent-seeking in the 
government and the elite. Rent-seeking may take the form of tariff protection or outright 
corruption. This in turn leads to massive distortions of the economy and slows down 
growth. Natural resource abundance may also create a false sense of security in the 
people, as pointed out by Auty (2001). Necessary (and possibly painful) reforms of the 
labour market and other sectors are delayed because the country can survive on natural 
resource exports alone. Corruption always goes hand in hand with rents, because pressure 
groups may block political reforms in order to protect their rents. If there are no rents to 
be protected or captured, there is no need for corruption. 
Why should rent-seeking behaviour be more common in countries where natural 
resources are abundant? Because the extraction of natural resources is usually controlled 
by huge corporations or state authorities. Natural resources are not produced in a 
competitive market environment. There are, so to say, huge barriers to entry. In contrast 
to manufacturing or services, it is simply not possible for private investors to start up a 
natural resource extraction company. The companies that exist often hold a monopoly 
position or are part of a cartel. Because of the need for acquiring mining concessions, 
there are close ties between the state authorities and the companies. 
Natural resources are often found in areas that are not easily accessible and rather thinly 
populated. In contrast to manufacturing and service industries, which are typically 
situated in populated areas, natural resource production has to take place where the 
resources are, and these are often in unfriendly regions. The rule of law is not very strong 
in these areas. 
In the case of Russia, the communist regime in some cases constructed whole cities just 
to provide housing for the workers in natural resource extraction. In such regions, the 
local natural resource producer has a monopsony position in the labour market, because 
there is no other employer in the region. This puts workers into a dependent position. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Company managers then have considerable leeway to do whatever they want. This makes 
them extremely vulnerable to bribery and other forms of illegal behaviour. 
The question is how corruption influences the growth rate of the economy. Some 
economists have seriously and plausibly argued that corruption may actually increase 
efficiency and welfare. In the presence of other distortions, corruption and black market 
activity may be a second-best solution to the original distortions. If the state bureaucracy 
is weakly developed, bribes and speed money may actually improve the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy because they are used to “buy” decisions that are beneficial and urgent for 
someone who might otherwise have to wait for years. One has to keep in mind, however, 
that a second-best solution is worse than a first-best solution, and that the first-best 
solution would be to install the appropriate legislation, a powerful jurisdiction, and an 
efficient bureaucracy. 
Corruption can create huge distortions in an economy. Since a bribe payment has to be 
kept secret, both bribers and bribees have to find ways to cover up the deal. Corrupt 
government officials and businessmen spend time and effort on hiding their activities. 
They could use the same time and effort to work productively. 
Another point is that bribe payments are usually not used in efficient ways. A corrupt 
official cannot take his bribe receipts to the capital market and use them to finance 
profitable investments, because others may ask questions where he got the money from. 
Bribe payments are hidden in safes and foreign bank accounts, where they are of no use 
for the domestic economy. 
Bardhan (1997) argues that “corruption has its adverse effects not only on static 
efficiency, but also on investment and growth.” If bribes have to be paid in order to 
receive a permission to start a new business, this clearly reduces the incentive to invest. 
Countries with efficient bureaucracies collect fees and taxes, but they are set up in such a 
way that they do not (at least in theory) depress economic growth. Investments leading to 
negative profits in the short run are tax-deductible, but bribes are not. Thus, according to 
Bardhan, the negative effect of corruption on growth results mainly from a disincentive to 
invest. Corruption leads to low investment, and this in turn leads to slower growth. 
Bardhan also argues that corruption does not only reduce the amount of investment, but 
also the composition of it. Even if the amount of investment is unchanged, it becomes The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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less productive, because it is diverted into inefficient areas. If corrupt government 
officials divert the cement from road and bridge building to build their own palace, this 
cement still enters the national accounts as investment, but it will probably not contribute 
to economic growth. 
A final point made by Bardhan is that entrepreneurship is discouraged by corruption. If it 
is frustrating to start a new business because there is a lot of red tape and bribe-paying 
involved, potential innovators may decide not to open their own business and work 
somewhere else. 
Thus, there are good reasons to believe that natural resource abundance, by concentrating 
wealth and power in the hands of a small elite, fosters corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviour. This in turn depresses economic growth, because the incentive to invest is 
reduced, and the remaining investment is not used efficiently. 
 
 
Crowding-Out Of Manufacturing 
 
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that the curse of natural resources must lie in the fact that 
natural resources tend to crowd out some activity X, which is crucial to economic growth. 
In their view, activity X is probably manufacturing. They explain how crowding-out of 
traded-manufacturing industries by a dominant natural resource sector can permanently 
depress economic growth: The benefits from the natural resource sector accrue to a part 
of the population that has no incentive to invest them productively. Instead, the export 
revenues are spent in such a way that the demand raises the prices of non-tradable goods 
and services, and especially wages. Since the manufacturing sector uses non-tradables 
and domestic labour as inputs for production, it will not be competitive on the world 
market. 
In countries with few natural resources, by contrast, the manufacturing sector receives a 
larger share of the total export revenue. Since manufacturing is a relatively competitive 
sector, the money is spent efficiently: It is invested in new capital and new technologies. 
This raises the productivity of labour. Output grows, wages rise, and capital owners earn The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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a fair return on their investment. There may also be technological progress in the form of 
learning-by-doing. If this mechanism does not work, there is no growth throughout the 
whole economy. 
In other words, manufacturing may exhibit a positive externality to the economy, as 
Sachs and Warner (1995) point out. The problem in natural resource abundant countries 
is that the producers of manufactures do not capture the whole benefits from their 
activities. All they see is that due to high input prices, their competitiveness is low, and 
they close down their businesses. As a result the positive externalities, which would 
accrue to the country as a whole, are lost. 
If this hypothesis is to be tested with empirical observations, the test requires some 
measure for the relative price of tradable goods. Unfortunately, such a measure is not 
directly available. Sachs and Warner (2001) solve this problem by calculating the ratio of 
a country’s purchasing power parity exchange rate to its nominal exchange rate. This 
procedure should result in an unbiased estimator because the price of tradables is more or 
less equal everywhere, so the general price level can be used as an indicator. It is a 
weighted average of the prices of tradables and non-tradables. 
Sachs and Warner (2001) then perform a test on the difference in price levels. They 
control for the fact that in more developed countries, the price level is generally higher 
than in less-developed ones. As a result, they find that there is indeed a positive 
relationship between natural resource abundance and the general price level. So far, the 
explanation is credible. 
The question then is whether the higher price level really impedes export growth. 
Unfortunately, Sachs and Warner do not provide a test whether high price levels are 
really negatively correlated with export growth. Although one should expect that 
competitiveness suffers under high price levels, which would lead to lower export 
growth, it would be interesting to know the significance and the size of this relationship. 
However, they do show that the contribution of the growth of manufacturing exports to 
overall economic growth was smaller in natural resource abundant countries. They derive 
a proxy for this contribution by multiplying the growth in value added from 
manufacturing exports over the whole time period times the share of manufacturing The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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exports in GDP in the starting year. This proxy, they say, is negatively correlated with 
natural resource abundance. 
In addition to the rise in the general price level, natural resource abundance may also 
increase exchange rate volatility. Many countries are richly endowed with only one or 
two specific natural commodities. They are not sufficiently diversified, so that a shock in 
demand for their main export goods can have huge impacts on their exchange rate. 
Exchange rate volatility obviously provides another impediment to the growth of 
manufacturing exports. 
The facts mentioned above provide a credible explanation for the curse of natural 
resources: Exports of manufacturing grow more slowly than otherwise, and the 
manufacturing sector as a whole will grow more slowly because it also faces foreign 
competition in the domestic market. The crippling of the manufacturing sector slows 
down overall economic growth, partly because the positive externalities from 
manufacturing in the form of faster technological progress are lost. 
 
 
Neglect Of Investment In Human Capital 
 
A similar reasoning of crowding out can be applied for investment in human capital. If 
high wages make manufacturing unprofitable, they also reduce the attractiveness of 
investing in education. Gylfason (2001) argues that it is not the existence of natural 
resources per se that imposes a drag on growth, but rather the way governments deal with 
the issue. Using public expenditure on education as indicator, Gylfason finds a 
statistically significant relationship between natural resource abundance and low levels of 
educational effort. Counter-examples include Botswana and Norway. Other indicators 
also show a negative correlation between natural resource abundance and educational 
effort. 
As a next step, Gylfason argues that education is important for economic growth. He 
finds clearly positive, but decreasing, returns to education. A positive relationship 
between secondary school enrolment and economic growth is found significant. Gylfason The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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concludes that about half of the natural resource curse works through the education 
channel. 
From a theoretical point of view, it makes perfect sense to expect that education has an 
impact on growth. First of all, human capital is a production factor just like physical 
capital. Therefore, investment in human capital is the same as investment in physical 
capital. Even the simple Solow model predicts that as long as a country is below its 
steady state, a higher savings rate will lead to faster growth, and most countries are not in 
their steady state in reality. An extended Solow model with both human and physical 
capital can explain a large part of the variation in growth rates that we observe among 
countries: There is conditional convergence because each country is converging towards 
its unique steady state, and hardly any country can be said to be in a steady state. 
Furthermore, in endogenous growth theory, the level of human capital can have a huge 
impact not only on short-run growth but also on growth in the long run. If the speed of 
technological progress depends on the level of the human capital stock, and this is a 
perfectly plausible assumption, then the long-run growth rate of the economy also 
depends on the level of the human capital stock. The size of the effect of investment in 
human capital depends on the specification of the model and on the size of the 
parameters: If the stock of knowledge helps in gaining additional knowledge, and 
knowledge is produced by human capital, there may be increasing returns to human 
capital. In this case, the benefits from investing in education can be enormous. 
On the other hand, additional knowledge may become more and more difficult to acquire 
once a high stock of knowledge exists. Then there could be decreasing returns to human 
capital, so the benefits from education are rather small. 
 The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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3 Evidence For The Curse 
 
The Relationship Between Natural Resource Abundance And Growth 
 
If we wish to examine the effect of natural resource abundance on growth, we need to 
find a measure for “natural resource abundance”. Since the concept itself is somewhat 
vague, there is no unique measure for it. Even if there were such a measure, it would 
probably not be available for most of the countries being studied. Hence, we will have to 
rely on a proxy. 
A statistic that is available for most countries are data on exports. Specifically, the share 
of primary goods in total exports can be calculated from official trade statistics, which 
should be relatively reliable. From the available data, this variable can be calculated for 
twenty of the transition economies, and we will call this variable ShaPrimEx.
2 
If the curse of natural resources also affects the transition economies, we observe a 
negative relation between natural resource abundance and per capita growth. Figure 3.1 
plots the share of primary goods in exports against the growth of GDP per capita. As the 
curse hypothesis predicts, there is indeed a negative relation between these two variables. 
In fact, a glance at the figure gives any researcher a strong urge to run a regression of per 
capita growth on the share of primary goods in exports in order to test whether the 
immediate impression is supported by the data. 
 
                                                 
2 Note that this measure is very similar to the one used by Sachs and Warner, the share of primary exports 
in GDP. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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The result of this simple regression is shown in Table 3.1. The dependent variable is 
average growth of real GDP per capita, and the independent variable is the share of 
primary goods in total exports. We find a p-value close to zero, so we can say without 
exaggeration that we have found strong evidence for the curse of natural resources. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R² is close to 70 percent. This means that the share of primary 
goods in total exports can explain two thirds of the variation in per capita growth among 
the transition economies. 
 
Table 3.1: The Effect of Natural Resource Abundance on Growth 
Dependent variable    AvGroRGDP 
Multiple correlation coefficient    0,828530837   
R²     0,686463348   
Adjusted R²    0,669044645   
Standard Error    1,729683513   
Observations     20   
        
  Coefficient Standard  Error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 0,96947695 0,74587242 1,29978924  0,21007313
ShaPrimEx -11,4553822 1,82477286 -6,27770309  6,4137E-06
 
 
Test For Omitted Geography Bias 
 The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Sachs and Warner (1997) admit that one possible explanation for the Curse could be that 
the results were simply biased. Some countries may have a more favourable geography 
than others. In such a case, if all countries were equally endowed with natural resources 
in 1900, but differed in their geographic situation, they would have different growth rates. 
By 2000, those countries with a favourable geography would be relatively rich, and the 
others would be relatively poor. The share of natural resources in GDP would be higher 
in the poor countries simply because the total economic size of these countries would be 
smaller. We would then find a negative correlation between economic development and 
natural resources, and conclude falsely that natural resources had slowed down growth. 
In order to test for this possibility, Sachs and Warner propose a simple test, arguing that if 
there is an omitted variable like geography, the countries with favourable geography will 
always grow faster than others, not only in the time period being analysed. This 
possibility can be tested for by including the average annual growth rate of previous 
periods as an additional variable in a regression. Following the reasoning of Sachs and 
Warner, we can test for omitted geography bias in the sample of the transition economies 
by including average growth in the decade before the transition in a regression. 
 
Table 3.2: Test for omitted geography bias 
Dependent variable    AvGroRGDP 
Multiple correlation coefficient    0,8809112   
R²     0,77600455   
Adjusted R²    0,74965214   
Standard Error    1,52825473   
Observations     20   
        
  Coefficient Standard  Error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 2,12297159 0,81360618 2,60933561  0,01832268
ShaPrimEx -11,0407386 1,66802137 -6,61906305  4,3445E-06
Growth8089 -0,51002617 0,24796792 -2,05682323  0,05538458
 
Table 3.2 shows the result of such a test. The additional variable is average GDP growth 
between 1980 and 1989.
3 The export share of primary goods is still highly significant, so 
the curse hypothesis easily survives this test. 
                                                 
3 Ideally, one would use per capita growth, if such a data were available. However, although population 
growth rates are not known, they were probably low, so GDP growth should serve well enough as a proxy. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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A somewhat surprising result of this test is that the coefficient on growth in the 1980s is 
negative and rather significantly so. Apparently, countries that enjoyed high growth in the 
1980s tended to grow slowly in the 1990s. This observation is rather puzzling, and it 





The results so far are rather interesting, and they seem to provide strong evidence for the 
curse hypothesis. However, it is possible that the seemingly strong negative relation 
between natural resource abundance and growth that we find in a simple regression 
vanished in a multiple regression containing more variables. Table 3.3 shows the results 
of a multiple regression containing the export share of primary goods plus a number of 
other plausible explanatory variables. 
 
Table 3.3: Regression 1 
Dependent variable  AvGroRGDPpC  
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,93478710  
R² 0,87382692  
Adjusted R²  0,77288845  
Standard error  1,49514695  
Observations 19  
    
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept -0,34994036 21,4480685 -0,01631571  0,98730346
ShaPrimEx -9,00565611 2,44982414 -3,67604187  0,00427423
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,40778512 1,71367960 1,98857775  0,07479748
TradLib 0,40729916 0,40256091 1,01177028  0,33550217
LOG(CapForm) -7,77819003 4,26033497 -1,82572265  0,09785768
SCI 2,97926160 5,38629211 0,55311920  0,59233128
LOG(SecEnrol90) -2,13034308 10,7264525 -0,19860649  0,84655026
ExGro9499 0,18349003 0,06919611 2,65173917  0,02424058
PopGro8999 1,11799161 0,82056184 1,36247088  0,20294476
 
The most interesting number in Table 3.3 is of course the p-value of ShaPrimEx, because 
it indicates the significance of the export share of primary goods. We find that the p-value The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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is higher than in the simple regression, but it is still lower than one percent. By any 
reasonable standard we can say that the export share of primary goods is significant. 
Let us take a closer look at the other variables that are included in the regression, why 
they might be important, and whether they are significant. Real GDP per capita in 1989 is 
included to test for convergence. Many growth models predict convergence, implying 
that countries with a high GDP per capita in 1989 should tend to experience low growth 
in the 1990s. Apparently, this was not the case among the transition economies. The 
coefficient of LOG(RGDPpC89) is positive, and with a p-value of 7.5 percent, it may 
even be significant. If this is the case, it would indicate that there was actually some 
divergence instead of convergence among the transition economies. 
TradLib is an index of trade liberalisation. Most transition economies implemented trade 
liberalisation policies during the 1990s, but the pace of these reforms differed very 
much.. Since numerous studies have shown that free trade can have a significant impact 
on growth (think of Sachs and Warner’s openness index), one might expect a positive 
relationship between the pace of trade liberalisation and growth. In line with this 
expectation, the coefficient on TradLib is positive, but it is not very significant. 
Capital formation (as a percentage of GDP) is included because it may also have an 
impact on growth. In the language of growth theory, all the transition economies were out 
of their respective steady states in the beginning of the 1990s, and under such 
circumstances, savings may have a huge impact on growth. Therefore, it is rather 
surprising that we find a negative coefficient on this variable. Fortunately, it is not very 
significant, and we need not pursue this topic here. 
SCI (state corruption index) serves as a proxy for corruption, which is admittedly hard to 
measure. Intuitively, corruption is probably not good for the economy, so we might 
expect a negative coefficient on this variable. In this regression, however, the coefficient 
on SCI has the wrong sign and is insignificant. We will see later that the reason for this is 
the high correlation between ShaPrimEx and SCI. 
Enrolment in secondary schools is included as a proxy for human capital. The growth 
literature has found several arguments why human capital may be important for growth, 
but in the case at hand, it appears to be rather insignificant. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Export growth has also been identified as a potential source of overall economic growth. 
As we would have expected, the coefficient of ExGro9499 is positive and quite 
significant. 
The final explanatory variable in this regression is population growth. Since the days of 
Thomas Malthus economists have discussed extensively the impact of population growth 
on the growth of income per capita, and the dominant view is that under almost all 
circumstances the impact is negative. The regression at hand does not provide support for 
this view, because the coefficient on PopGro8999 is positive. However, it is not very 
significant, and even if it were significant, it would not inform us about the direction of 
causality. 
Finally, the adjusted R² is about 77 percent, which is rather high for a cross section 
analysis. This indicates a good fit of the regression, and it suggests that the most relevant 
variables are indeed included in the regression. 
So far, the Curse hypothesis appears credible even when a number of other relevant 
variables are included. However, regression 1 contains some highly insignificant 
variables. If we wish to know which variables have really had a significant impact on 
growth, a possible strategy is to perform a stepwise regression, excluding one irrelevant 
variable after the other until only the significant variables remain. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Table 3.4: Stepwise Regression Results 
       
Regression  1 2 3 4 5 
       
R²  0,873827 0,873329 0,866161 0,849142 0,836822 
Adjusted  R²  0,772888 0,792721 0,804389 0,795264 0,793308 
       
Intercept  -0,34994 -4,45828 -4,53763 -3,55013 -2,82826 
  (0,98730) (0,42774) (0,39053) (0,50324) (0,59074) 
ShaPrimEx  -9,00566 -9,09331 -8,17260 -8,48774 -9,21668 
  (0,00427) (0,00227) (0,00068) (0,00047) (0,00010) 
LOG(RGDPpC89)  3,40779 3,44988 3,03152 2,14752 2,41308 
  (0,07480) (0,05722) (0,05682) (0,12249) (0,08078) 
TradLib 0,40730  0,43229  0,45577  0,36942   
 (0,33550)  (0,26163)  (0,20841)  (0,30304)   
LOG(CapForm)  -7,77819 -7,99803 -6,65841 -4,78630 -4,62605 
  (0,09786) (0,06668) (0,06685) (0,14047) (0,15311) 
SCI  2,97926  3,29748     
  (0,59233)  (0,51594)     
LOG(SecEnrol90)  -2,13034      
  (0,84655)      
ExGro9499  0,18349 0,18296 0,16584 0,15742 0,14162 
  (0,02424) (0,01824) (0,00721) (0,01001) (0,01414) 
PopGro8999 1,11799  1,11962  0,85122    
 (0,20294)  (0,18098)  (0,22097)     
 
Table 3.4 shows the results of such a stepwise regression. It reports the estimated 
coefficients on each of the explanatory variables and its respective p-value (in brackets). 
When we exclude one irrelevant variable after the other, we end up with the model of 
regression 5, which includes only four remaining explanatory variables, one of them 
being ShaPrimEx. These four variables together account for about 80 percent of the 
variation in growth rates, and ShaPrimEx is the most significant of them. 




The model of regression 5 is quite successful in the sense that it can explain a large part 
of the growth patterns in the transition economies, using only four explanatory variables. 
Some further refinements are possible, though. 
So far we have assumed that export growth affects all countries in a similar fashion. The 
specification of the model suggests that an increase in export growth by one percent 
would have the same effect on growth in all countries. In reality, however, it is possible 
that export growth is more crucial in natural resource abundant countries than in others. 
The reason is that these countries are typically dependent on their export revenues to 
finance investment into new capital goods. As Szirmai (1997) explains, theories of 
dependent development argue that in countries that are very dependent on primary 
exports, the internal market is “disrupted” in the sense that there are few linkages 
between the primary sector and the rest of the economy. There is no continuous 
production chain from primary goods production to manufacturing. Instead, these 
countries export primary goods and import capital goods. External shocks, such as a 
worldwide economic downturn and a fall in demand for this country’s exports, have a 
much stronger effect on these countries because the lack of export revenue causes a fall in 
investment. The domestic economy cannot make the capital goods itself. Without export 
revenues, the country cannot pay for capital imports, and investment falls. Since 
investment is crucial for future growth, a fall in export revenue can have a lasting effect 
on these countries’ growth rates. 
In countries with little primary exports, the effect of a fall in export revenue is not that 
strong. These economies are typically more diversified in the sense that capital goods are 
at least partially produced within the country. Export revenues are not spent primarily on 
capital goods, but also on consumption, so a fall in export revenues affects both 
consumption and investment proportionately. The effect of export growth on economic 
growth is thus less pronounced. 
In order to allow for asymmetric effects of export growth, one can calculate an interaction 
variable to measure the effect of a combination of natural resource abundance and export The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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growth. This interaction term is included in regression 6, where it is simply called 
“InterAction”. It is defined as ShaPrimEx times ExGro9499. 
 
Table 3.5: Allowing for Asymmetric Effect 
Dependent variable  AvGroRGDPpC    
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,93384342  
R² 0,87206354  
Adjusted R²  0,82637195  
Standard error  1,27272259  
Observations 20  
    
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept -2,47744544 4,72064786 -0,52481047  0,60792592
ShaPrimEx -12,343464 2,26133764 -5,45847898  8,427E-05
LOG(RGDPpC89) 2,00221671 1,19959798 1,66907309  0,11730256
LOG(CapForm) -2,83711121 2,96101928 -0,95815357  0,35424066
ExGro9499 -0,02449239 0,09665392 -0,25340302  0,80364011
InterAction 0,43265706 0,22031713 1,96379219  0,06972951
 
Table 3.5 shows the result of including this interaction term. Compared to regression 5, 
adjusted R² has increased, which indicates that it was probably a good idea to include 
InterAction. Note that export growth is now insignificant. This finding suggests that the 
impact of export growth is indeed asymmetric; the effect is more pronounced in natural 
resource reliant countries. 
After the inclusion of InterAction, export growth and capital formation are rather 
insignificant. Excluding these two insignificant variables
4, we end up with the refined 
model, the results of which are presented in Table 3.6. 
                                                 
4 Once again following a stepwise regression technique. ExGro9499 is excluded first because it is highly 
insignificant. In this reduced model (Regression 7, not reported) LOG(CapForm) is still insignificant and is 
therefore also excluded. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Table 3.6: The Refined Model 
Dependent variable  AvGroRGDPpC    
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,92709996  
R² 0,85951433  
Adjusted R²  0,83317327  
Standard error  1,24754617  
Observations 20  
    
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept -5,1525964 4,02528521 -1,28005747  0,21877353
ShaPrimEx -12,0397385 1,55460682 -7,74455528  8,4267E-07
LOG(RGDPpC89) 1,60229169 1,0890572 1,47126495  0,1606136
InterAction 0,37572511 0,1042608 3,60370443  0,00238051
 
What Table 3.6 shows is that we have found a model containing only three explanatory 
variables that is capable of explaining more than 80 percent of the variation in growth 
rates of the transition economies during the 1990s. The estimated coefficient on 
ShaPrimEx is negative and highly significant, with an extremely low p-value. The 
coefficient on RGDPpC89 is positive, suggesting that high initial income led to faster 
growth, but it is only borderline significant. InterAction is highly significant, supporting 
the notion that export growth has a positive, but asymmetric, effect on growth. 
Thus, the conclusions of this section are: 
1)  There is strong evidence for the curse of natural resources in the transition 
economies. 
2)  Export growth had a positive impact on growth, and this impact was more 
pronounced in the natural resource abundant countries. 
3)  Natural resource abundance, initial income, and export growth together explain a 
large part of the different growth performances of the transition economies. 
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4 Reasons For The Curse 
 
Having established that the curse of natural resources affected the transition economies, 
we can now move on and try to find out how the curse has worked. In Section 2 we have 
seen that there are three popular explanations for the curse: corruption/rent-seeking, 
crowding out of manufacturing, and neglect of education. Now we will examine whether 
these phenomena have also occurred in the transition economies, and if they have, we 




Corruption is difficult to measure because it is by definition not observable
5. In this paper 
we use a “state corruption index” (SCI) from the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey conducted by the World Bank in 1999. This index measures the 
extent to which decisions by the government, the central bank, and the courts can be, or 
have to be, “bought” by firms. The larger the index, the greater the extent of corruption. 
In contrast to other corruption indexes, the State Capture Index is available for almost all 
of the transition economies, because the study was explicitly aimed at these countries. 
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5 In practice, some corruption is observed, but this is only the “top of the iceberg”. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Figure 4.1 plots the relation between SCI and the share of primary goods in total exports. 
At a first glance, the relation appears to be strongly positive. This impression is 
reinforced by the results from the corresponding regression, which are shown in Table 
4.1. The p-value of ShaPrimEx is less than one percent, which means that there is a 
significant positive relationship between natural resource abundance and corruption. 
Countries that are natural resource abundant are plagued by corruption. 
 
Table 4.1: Natural Resource Abundance and Corruption 
Dependent variable  SCI     
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,63407624     
R² 0,40205268     
Adjusted R²  0,36687930     
Standard error  0,08913191     
Observations 19     
        
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 0,08214085  0,03907924  2,10190517  0,05077224 
ShaPrimEx 0,31881751  0,09429913  3,38091674  0,00355144 
 
The relationship between natural resource abundance and corruption is now clear, but the 
question now is: Does corruption affect growth? To answer this question, look at Figure 
4.2 and Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Corruption and Growth 
Dependent variable  AvGroRGDPpC  
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,63023134  
R² 0,39719154  
Adjusted R²  0,36705111  
Standard error  2,76795297  
Observations 22  
        
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 0,27828993 1,21333458 0,22935960  0,82091870
SCI -19,5980626 5,39868293 -3,63015626  0,00166731
 
Both Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 tell a clear-cut story: There is a highly significant negative 
relationship between corruption. In a simple regression of average growth on SCI, the p-
value of SCI is below one percent, so it is clearly significant. 
What does this tell us about the possible explanation of the curse? One argument is that 
abundant natural resources lead to high corruption, and high corruption slows down 
growth. In the data, natural resource abundance is associated with high corruption, and 
high corruption in turn is associated with low growth. These findings support the view 
that corruption is one reason for the curse of natural resources. 
 
Crowding-Out Of Manufacturing 
 
This phenomenon is also called “The Dutch disease” because it was observed in the 
Dutch economy after natural gas was discovered and extraction had begun on a large 
scale. In an economy that suffers from the Dutch disease, the revenues from primary 
exports raise the purchasing power of the economy. The additional wealth is at least 
partially spent on non-tradable goods and services. Since purchasing power parity does 
not hold for non-tradables, the price of these goods is free to rise even under free trade. 
The rise in prices for non-tradables creates problems for the manufacturing sector: 
Among non-tradables are crucial inputs for manufacturing production, such as wages and 
rents for buildings. Due to the high input prices the manufacturing sector is 
internationally not competitive. Exports of manufactures thus grow slower. Depending on 
transport costs and tariffs, foreign producers may enter the market and drive prices down, The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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so that domestic producers cannot compete. This would reduce the growth of the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. 
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that manufacturing may exhibit positive externalities for 
the economy as a whole. They say that in manufacturing, technological progress is 
achieved simply through learning-by-doing. In other sectors, there is less learning-by-
doing. If this is true, the crippling of the manufacturing sector due to high price levels 
will have a lasting negative effect on growth. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between natural resource abundance and relative price 
levels. From the figure, no obvious relationship is apparent. However, the regression 
results in Table 4.3 show that there is in fact a relationship between ShaPrimEx, but it is 
non-linear. The estimates imply that up to a value of 49% an increase in the share of 
primary exports increases the relative price level. Only four countries exceed this value, s 
in general we can conclude that natural resource abundance does increase the relative 
price level in a country.
6 
                                                 
6 The regression in Table 4.3 contains GDP per capita in addition to ShaPrimEx and ShaPrimEx². 
Theoretically, we would expect that in rich countries the price level is higher because of non-tradables such 
as services. This expectation is confirmed; the coefficient on GDPpC is positive and significant. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Table 4.3: Evidence for the Dutch disease 
Dependent variable  RelPrice  
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,66328678  
R² 0,43994936  
Adjusted R²  0,31993851  
Standard error  0,20765056  
Observations 18  
        
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept -0,34002636 0,31819167 -1,06862118  0,30332048
ShaPrimEx 3,1341004 1,32628839 2,36306103  0,03312783
GDPpC 7,9745E-05 3,043E-05 2,62057338  0,02015343
ShaPrimEx² -3,20235247 1,29137544 -2,47979973  0,02647932
 
Having accepted a positive relationship between natural resource abundance and relative 
price levels, we now have to examine whether a high price level has indeed negative 
consequences for growth. Figure 4.4 plots the relative price level against growth. A 
negative relationship is not apparent, but the graph suggests that there may be a non-
linear relationship. 
 































































Table 4.4 confirms this impression. When we regress growth on relative price and its 
square, we find that there is a relationship between growth and the price level, and it is 
quite significant. The estimates imply that at low relative price levels (below 0,63) a rise 
in the relative price level is associated with an increase in growth. Since the relative price The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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level was well within the increasing range in most of the transition economies, we can 
conclude that in general high relative price levels are associated with slow growth. This 
finding is rather puzzling. Why should higher relative price levels be associated with 
faster growth? According to the Dutch disease hypothesis, higher price levels should 
actually slow down growth, but this has not been the case in the transition economies. 
 
Table 4.4: Growth and Relative Price Levels II 
Dependent variable  AvGroRGDPpC  
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,78805447  
R² 0,62102984  
Adjusted R²  0,58113825  
Standard error  2,23686642  
Observations 22  
        
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept -16,3910391 2,33577078 -7,01740052  1,1081E-06
RelPrice 55,104516 10,1419674 5,43331621  3,0485E-05
RelPrice² -43,1806326 8,52862407 -5,06302449  6,9076E-05
 
Thus, we find rather mixed evidence for the Dutch disease hypothesis. Natural resource 
abundance is indeed associated with high relative price levels, as predicted by the 
hypothesis, but these higher price levels do not seem to have had a negative impact on 
growth. 
 
Neglect of Investment in Human Capital 
 
Gylfason (2001) finds that among developing countries, neglect of investment in human 
capital is one of the prime reasons that explain the curse of natural resources. In fact, the 
impact of neglecting education is so strong that “of the total effect of natural capital on 
growth, almost half can [...] be attributed to education...”. 
In traditional growth models, neither the rate of investment in capital nor the stock of 
capital influences long-run economic growth. This holds for human capital just as it does 
for physical capital. However, there are three reasons why one might suspect that 
investment in human capital could have had an impact on growth in the transition 
economies: Firstly, one decade is probably not what most growth theories mean when The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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they are concerned with the “long run”. And in the short run, a rise in the savings rate 
does speed up growth because the economy moves toward a new (higher) steady state. 
Second, the notion that the savings rate does not influence growth only holds if the 
economy is in a steady state, but the transition economies were definitely not in a steady 
state after 1989. They may have come from a steady state, but during the 1990s they were 
in transition towards a new steady state. Third, endogenous growth theory has shown that 
if technological progress is determined endogenously, investment in human capital may 
very well have an impact on long-run growth. Different models and different assumptions 
lead to different results, but in many cases the stock, or the growth of the stock, of human 
capital determines growth. One might argue that, since the transition economies are not at 
the technological frontier, technological progress is exogenous to them. But even in that 
case, they may still need human capital in order to understand and apply the knowledge 
that spills over from abroad. 
 
Figure 5.6: Natural Resource Abundance and 
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Figure 4.5 plots the share of primary goods in exports against secondary enrolment rates 
in 1990. There is no obvious relationship between these two variables. Over the whole 
range of the country sample, with ShaPrimEx varying between twelve percent and eighty-
seven percent, there is no trend in gross secondary enrolment. The corresponding 
regression, reported in Table 4.5, confirms this observation.  
 The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Table 5.5: Natural Resource Abundance and Secondary Enrolment 1990 
Dependent variable  SecEnrol90  
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,14468910  
R² 0,02093493  
Adjusted R²  -0,03345757  
Standard error  10,8296155  
Observations 20  
        
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 83,8727567 4,66993613 17,9601507  6,1163E-13
ShaPrimEx 7,08796376 11,4249736 0,62039213  0,54277538
 
In this respect, the transition economies differ starkly from developing countries. In 
developing countries, the relationship between natural resource abundance and education 
is significant and quite strong. Gylfason (2001) finds that “an increase in the natural 
capital share by five percentage points goes along with a decrease by 10 percentage 
points in the secondary school enrolment rate...” If this relationship would hold in the 
transition economies, with their enormous differences in natural resource abundance, we 
should observe huge variations in secondary enrolment rates. 
One reason may be that prior to 1989, investment in education was not based on market 
incentives, but on ideological ones. The neglect of human capital investment in natural 
resource abundant countries is usually explained by a crowding-out effect of the primary 
goods industries: If unskilled workers can earn a reasonable wage in the primary goods 
sector, they have little incentive to invest in education. High wages in the primary sector 
crowd out investment in human capital. This influences the decisions of individuals as 
well as the government. Individuals consider the alternative between working at a 
reasonable wage and going through long years of unpaid and unpleasant education. 
Limited access to schooling especially in the countryside might also require moving to 
another city. The government in turn has little incentive to invest heavily in education as 
long as the economy can live off the primary goods sector fairly enough. There may even 
be lobbying from the natural resource industry against education programmes because 
they may prefer cheap unskilled workers to expensive skilled ones. 
In the centrally planned economies, things were different: There was no crowding out of 
investment in human capital because of the distorted prices. Schooling was essentially 
free and widely available. Therefore, individuals went to school happily. Governments The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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also had incentives to massively subsidise education for both ideological and pragmatic 
reasons. In an idealistic view, one may argue that there was still the socialist ideal of a 
classless society. Necessary for the classless society was obviously an equally educated 
workforce. Differences in the access to education would again increase social differences 
and lead to class-building. 
In a more pragmatic view, Soviet leaders stressed the need for education in their quest for 
technological supremacy over the West. Even in the 1980s, when the communist 
countries had fallen far behind in terms of living standards and economic development, 
they were still renowned for considerable scientific achievements. The basis for the 
communist countries’ strength in science was their heavy investment in education. For all 
these reasons, secondary enrolment rates in most communist countries were close to the 
maximum of one hundred. 
If the above reasoning is true, one would expect that during the transition towards a 
market economy the mechanism that causes the negative relationship between natural 
resource abundance and educational efforts begins to take effect. However, evidence for 
this view is not easily found. Even with the most recent reliable data on secondary 
enrolment (from 1997) the statistical relationship between natural resource abundance 
and secondary enrolment is weak.
7 The picture looks a bit different when we use the 
change in secondary enrolment rates, rather than its absolute value. 
 
Table 5.6: Natural Resource Abundance and 
The Change in Secondary Enrolment Rates 
Dependent variable  SecEnrolChng  
Multiple correlation coefficient  0,506801288  
R² 0,256847545  
Adjusted R²  0,169417844  
Standard error  2,594583958  
Observations 20  
        
 Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 4,264613895 2,316632847 1,840867404  0,083162510
ShaPrimEx -24,08099180 12,31825135 -1,954903430  0,067241389
ShaPrimEx² 20,61066025 12,98248449 1,587574417  0,130806711
 
                                                 
7 A regression of secondary enrolment rates in 1997 on ShaPrimEx yields a negative coefficient for 
ShaPrimEx and a p-value of slightly more than 10 percent. This provides some weak evidence for the view 
that natural resources affect enrolment rates, but it is not very convincing. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Table 5.6 reports the results of a regression of the change in secondary enrolment rates 
between 1990 and 1995. One can see that there is a negative association between natural 
resource abundance (the effect of ShaPrimEx is negative for small values of ShaPrimEx), 
but the p-value of 6.7% is not very convincing. What we can conclude is that there is 
weak evidence for the view that natural resource abundance crowds out education. 
It is quite likely that in the future the negative relationship between natural resource 
abundance and educational efforts will become more obvious. In Table 5.6 we have seen 
that there is weak evidence for a trend; in natural resource abundant countries secondary 
enrolment rates are falling on average. If this trend continues, the differences in 
secondary enrolment rates may become larger in the future. 
Since we observe no strong relationship between natural resource abundance and 
enrolment rates we must conclude that at least for the first half of the 1990s education 
cannot be an explanation for the curse of natural resources. Indeed, there is no significant 
relationship between secondary enrolment rates in 1990, 1995, or 1997 and growth 
during the 1990s. However, we should not conclude that education has been unimportant. 
The point is that education can affect growth only with a time lag. The time period being 
studied in this paper is simply too short to reflect the long-run effects of investments in 
education. We have found some evidence that education may have been neglected in the 
natural resource abundant countries, and we should expect this neglect of education to 
have adverse consequences in the future. 




The Curse Exists 
 
There can be little doubt that among the group of transition economies studied in this 
paper, natural resource abundance is associated with slow economic growth. The 
evidence is surprisingly strong - those countries that are relatively abundant in natural 
resources performed very poorly in terms of economic growth. The countries that are less 
abundant in natural resources recovered from the shock of transition much more quickly 
and returned to “normal” (positive) growth rates after three or less years of transition. 
Among the CEE-5 countries, which outperformed all other transition economies, Poland 
has the highest share of primary goods in total exports: 21 percent in 1999. None of the 
CEE-5 is natural resource abundant. The countries that rank highest in terms of natural 
resource abundance are “growth disasters”: Russia, with a primary export share of 57 
percent, suffered negative GDP growth rates from 1990 to 1998. Moldova, with a 
primary export share of 73 percent, had negative growth rates throughout the last decade 
of the 20
th century. These observations, eye-catching as they are, are no exceptions. 
Multiple regressions including a wide range of other explanatory variables show that 
natural resource abundance is statistically negatively correlated with economic growth. 
Natural resource abundance is one of the most powerful variables in explaining economic 
growth in the transition economies. 
Aside from natural resource abundance, there are two other important explanatory 
variables: Real GDP per capita in 1989 and the growth of exports. Real GDP per capita in 
1989 is positively correlated with growth in the 1990s. This may seem surprising, 
because usually, initial income is negatively correlated with subsequent growth, 
indicating conditional convergence. Among the transition economies there appears to be 
no conditional convergence. The level of GDP per capita in 1989 can be interpreted as a 
proxy for the general development level of an economy. Economies that were relatively 
well developed may have been in a better position to deal with the problems of transition 
than less developed economies. This may explain why relatively advanced economies, The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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such as the CEE-5, managed to recover quickly. The less advanced economies, especially 
the outlying regions of the former Soviet Union, were less adaptive. This theory explains 
why initial GDP per capita is positively correlated with subsequent growth. The effect of 
export growth on GDP growth is more complicated. Export growth itself is positively 
correlated with economic growth, but the effect may not be symmetric in all countries. 
The interaction term used in the refined model indicates that the effect of export growth 
on output growth may be stronger in natural resource abundant countries than in other 
countries. 
These three variables, natural resource abundance, initial GDP per capita, and export 
growth, together explain more than 80 percent of the variation in growth rates among the 
transition economies. Figure 5.1 shows how accurately the refined model from Table 3.6 
can “predict” the growth rates of the transition economies. 
 
Figure 5.1: Model Prediction Error
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The model prediction error is the difference between the growth rate that the model 
predicts when one enters the variables for each country and the actual growth rate. For 13 
out of the 20 countries for which the necessary data are available, the model prediction 
error is less than one percent. Only for two countries, Poland and Lithuania, the model 
prediction differs more than two percent from the actual value. 
To sum up, natural resource abundance had a very significant negative impact on 
economic growth in the transition economies. In fact, it appears to have been the most The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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important factor. Other important factors are the initial level of GDP per capita and 
export growth. 
 
Corruption Is The Main Reason For The Curse 
 
The reasons for the curse of natural resources have been summarised in Section 2. In the 
world of the transition economies, corruption seems to be the main driving force behind 
the curse: A state capture index, which measures the extent of corruption in the state 
bureaucracy, is closely correlated with natural resource abundance. This observation 
supports the theoretical argument that natural resource abundance tends to foster 
corruption. 
In Section 4.1 we have seen that there is a strong negative correlation between economic 
growth and the extent of corruption in a country. This finding completes the chain of 
causality: Natural resources abundance leads to corruption, and corruption leads to slow 
economic growth. Of course, the relationship is not perfect. Corruption is not caused 
solely by natural resources. The heritage of the former communist regimes certainly also 
plays a role. The various approaches to privatisation also influenced the extent of 
corruption: The Czech mass privatisation programme, for instance, gave rise to massive 
corruption, and this may explain why the Czech Republic performed worse than the other 
CEE-5 countries. The Polish mass privatisation, by contrast, was much more successful, 
and this may explain partly why Poland performed relatively well. 
The size of the effect is difficult to estimate because in order to do so, one needs to run a 
regression on growth with natural resource abundance and corruption as explanatory 
variables to discern the direct and indirect effects of natural resource abundance. Doing 
so leads to problems of multicollinearity, precisely because of the close correlation of 
natural resource abundance and corruption. The coefficient estimate of the corruption 
index then becomes very inaccurate. Future research might attempt to tackle this problem 
by using more sophisticated econometric methods like instrumental variables. 
Dutch disease effects may also play a role in the transition economies, but the evidence is 
mixed. Controlling for GDP per capita, we observe a non-linear, but positive, effect of The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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natural resource abundance on the relative price level of a country. According to theory, 
this relatively high price level should impose a drag on growth because it makes 
producers of manufactured goods incompetitive on the world market. We do not find a 
significant relationship between relative price levels and economic growth, so the Dutch 
disease hypothesis is not very convincing in the case at hand. Further research could aim 
at examining the growth of the manufacturing sector itself, if such data become available. 
In order to test whether there are indeed spillover effects from the manufacturing sector, 
one might also try find a relationship between manufacturing growth and TFP growth. 
Neglect of investment in human capital, which accounts for a large part of the total curse 
of natural resources in developing countries, seems to have had little impact on the 
transition economies. The reason is probably the time lag associated with education. 
There is some evidence for the claim that natural resource abundant countries have 
tended to neglect education. However, most transition countries started in 1990 at similar 
rates of secondary enrolment as a heritage of the communist system, which emphasised 
the role of education. The neglect of education may lead to differences in secondary 
enrolment rates, but by 1997, the effect was not yet very pronounced. As a result, there is 
little evidence for an impact of educational effort on economic growth. Since countries do 
not (yet) differ significantly in terms of enrolment rates, different enrolment rates cannot 
be an explanation for different growth rates. However, there is reason to assume that over 
time, the neglect of education will have an impact on growth. If the trend of neglecting 
education in natural resource abundant countries continues, this will finally result in 
different enrolment rates. And these differences in turn may have an impact on growth. 
 
 
Advice For Policy-Makers 
 
What can policy-makers in the transition countries learn from this paper? That natural 
resources are bad for growth? Should they set oilfields on fire and demolish the gold 
mines? The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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The answer is of course No! As Gylfason (2001) puts it: “it is not the existence of natural 
wealth as such that seems to be the problem, but rather the failure of public authorities to 
avert the dangers that accompany the gifts of nature. Good policies can turn abundant 
natural resource riches into an unambiguous blessing.” 
So what can be done to overcome the curse of natural resources? The most obvious 
solution is easier said than done: Fight corruption. The data show that countries where 
corruption is widespread and common perform poorly in terms of economic growth. Of 
course, corruption is not easily rooted out by sheer willpower. Something needs to be 
done against corruption, and policy-makers should definitely put more emphasis on the 
fight against corruption. If corruption cannot be rooted out completely, a more centralised 
state structure may be a good idea. Centralisation by itself does not reduce corruption, but 
in a centralised bureaucracy, corruption may have less distortionary effects than in a 
decentralised system (Bardhan, 1997). 
The positive effect of export growth on GDP growth also provides a useful hint. Policies 
that aim at increasing exports may have additional benefits. Most countries already 
pursue export-oriented economic policies. Membership in the EU may provide additional 
export growth. One might consider an industrial policy that targets especially the export-
oriented manufacturing sector. 
Another point is that education should not be neglected. The gains from education will 
accrue to the population with a time lag of more than a decade, which is why they are so 
often neglected by today’s policy-makers, but they are huge. 
A shining example of how to deal with extraordinary natural resource endowments is 
provided by Norway. In Norway, almost 90 percent of oil revenues are collected by the 
state. These revenues are then invested in infrastructure, education, and to a large share in 
foreign pension funds. This way, the Dutch disease effects are mitigated because only 
part of the oil revenues is spent in Norway itself. Furthermore, the benefits from oil 
extraction are spread evenly among the whole population and even over time. Of course, 
in order to follow the Norwegian example, one needs a strong, efficient bureaucracy. 
Otherwise, the oil revenues may again vanish in black holes somewhere in the state 
bureaucracy. This again strengthens the point to fight corruption. The Curse Of Natural Resources In The Transition Economies 
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Governments of natural resource abundant countries, if they want to raise national 
welfare, should announce credible actions against corruption and take swift action. They 
should set up proper tax systems and institutions that enforce the payment of taxes. If 
corruption is credibly fought, the revenues from natural resource exports may be used as 
in the Norwegian model. Thus, the main priority of these governments should be to find 
ways to reduce the extent of corruption within their state bureaucracy. 






The “transition economies” that are being studied in this paper are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. 
However, the most important variable in this paper, ShaPrimEx, is not available for 
Georgia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Therefore, these five 
countries are excluded in virtually all the regressions. Another important variable, SCI, is 
not available for Macedonia, and for this reason Macedonia drops out in some 
regressions. 
Most of the data were taken from the World Bank or United Nations databases. The 
whole dataset is available upon request from the author. 
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